Report to the Secretary of Defense

A Snapshot of the Utilization of Forces

Report FY09-5

- Recommendations to Study the Military Services’ Force Utilization and Deployment Policies and Practices

January 2009
A Snapshot of the Utilization of Forces

TASK

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance and direction to the Joint Staff for the accomplishment of priorities and strategic objectives for 2008-2009. One of those priorities was to “reset, reconstitute and revitalize our forces.” The Chairman expressed concern that multiple deployments and insufficient dwell ratios were taking an unsustainable toll on the force.

Recognizing the value of human capital in an enterprise, the Members of the Defense Business Board (DBB) shared the Chairman’s concern for the health of the force. Although the Board was not equipped to conduct a deep analysis of the Military Services’ force utilization and deployment policies and practices, the DBB formed a Task Group to identify, if possible, where stress was occurring.

The Task Group was comprised of Michael Bayer (Co-Chairman), Fred Cook (Co-Chairman), and Dov Zakheim. The Military Assistants were COL Kevin Doxey, USA and Col Dale Marks, USAF.

PREMISE

The Task Group began its examination of force utilization with the premise that since the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, the armed forces have been operating under an increased operational tempo that has caused stress on certain parts of the force. The Task Group understood that the Military Services were meeting these requirements by employing the following practices: 1) longer than desirable deployments; 2) over-utilization of certain elements of the force; and 3) stop-loss, (i.e., the involuntary extension of a Servicemember’s Active Duty service). Further, the Task Group considered the Army’s and Marine Corps’ plans to increase end-strength to meet this increased demand, and concluded that increased end-strength alone may not relieve stress sufficiently if the current force is not being fully utilized. A summary of the roles and responsibilities of the various actors who influence end-strength and future force structure decisions is displayed below.
The Task Group asked the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to examine pay records of all Active Duty military Servicemembers as of December 18, 2008, to determine the number of individuals that received payment of Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) over the 88 month period from September 2001 to December 2008. HFP is special pay for duty subject to hostile fire or imminent danger\(^1\). The Task Group reviewed this payroll data to develop a snapshot of the number of months that a Servicemember had received HFP, and to gain insights into the stress on the force. The Task Group chose to examine payroll records as a truth teller to provide a common unit of measure among all the armed forces.

The DFAS data produced a sample population of 1,466,753 personnel that was sorted by rank, grade and Service for both officers and enlisted personnel. DFAS excluded warrant officers from the examination, as those individuals could not be compared equally among all the Military Services.

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\(^1\) To determine which areas are designated to receive this special pay, commonly known as combat zones, the DBB used DoD Financial Management Regulation Vol. 7-A, Chapter 10, Figure 10-1, dated December 2008.
Defense Business Board

The Task Group expressed the results using four stress categories. Although these categories are arbitrary, they provide a reasonable length of time for exposure to conditions that warrant HFP. A description of these categories follows:

- 25 months or greater = “OVER STRESSED” (individuals who have had multiple unit deployments and/or long-term augmentations)
- 17-24 months = “HIGH STRESSED” (individuals who have had two unit deployments and/or long-term augmentation)
- 13-16 months = “LOW STRESSED” (individuals who have had at least one unit deployment or long-term augmentation)
- 12 months or less = “NOT STRESSED” (individuals who have not been on unit deployment or long-term augmentation)

The Task Group identified two limitations associated with this analysis; the data contained individuals who could deploy but are in positions that prevent them from deploying, and/or individuals who are in career management paths that exclude them from any consideration for deployment. Specifically, the data does not:

- Distinguish between special cases (e.g., wounded warriors, non-deployable, or HFP for visits in and out of the combat zone),
- Include those individuals who entered and left during the 88 month period and may actually underestimate the over-stressed and high-stressed populations,
- Reflect the impact of Service specific policies on “dwell-time” to reduce stress on the force, and
- Exclude new personnel in training status who could not be deployed by the date of the sample. This also underestimates the OVER-STRESSED and HIGH-STRESSED populations.

While the Task Group felt that it would be prudent to examine the stress on the National Guard and Reserve, these forces were not included
in this review due to the challenges in comparing their deployment rates to those of the Active Duty. For example, the National Guard and the Reserve forces come in and out of the Active Duty population and therefore this population is not constant. Specific business rules would have to be established to account for this variable.

OBSERVATIONS

The data reveals that a significant number {74% (1,089K)} of Active Duty personnel had 12 months or less of combat duty while others {6% (93K)} had 25 months or less (see Figure 1). Officers and enlisted were similar to each other in terms of stress when viewed as a whole. The group with 12 months or less of HFP included 584,812 Active Duty personnel who have never deployed to a combat zone. Approximately 40% of the total force had no HFP during the period.
The Task Group noticed a dissimilar level of stress among certain ranks over a selected period of time. Half of the Active Duty personnel who had never deployed (303,248) were junior individuals (E1 to E3 and O1 to O2) who were likely in training or waiting to deploy (see Figure 2). However, the E4 to E6 and the O3 to O4 groups appear to bear the greatest burden of stress. The following charts illustrate this point over the sample period (reduced to 36 months for clarity of presentation).

*Data examined included the period from September 2001 to December 2008. For purposes of illustration, only the first 36 months is shown.*

Figures 3 and 4 further illustrate the need for the Department to hold the group with ≥25 months of HFP as is, and better manage the group with 13 – 16 months of HFP. Doing so might control the growth of the group with 17 – 24 months of HFP, and present the Department with an opportunity to reduce stress on those subjected to excessive deployments.
Percent of Active Duty US Military Officers Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

Percent of Sample

Total Personnel: 163,034 + 27,095 + 19,727 + 12,834 = 222,690

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line

Figure 3

Percent of Active Duty US Military Enlisted Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

Percent of Sample

Total Personnel: 926,239 + 152,543 + 85,455 + 79,826 = 1,244,063

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line

Figure 4
Among the Military Services, the Army appears to experience the
greatest stress as a percentage of the population sample. However, the
data does not identify those individuals subjected to excessive
deployments and/or higher rates of deployment, (e.g. high demand/low
density specialties, or those who may have left the Military Services
because of stress). Figure 5 provides greater insight into the specific ranks
that are bearing the greatest amount of stress, while highlighting Army
specific data on those that are “OVER STRESSED.”

Figure 5 Summary of Officers and Enlisted that are “OVER
STRESSED”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-5 to O-6: 6% of sample (Army ~ 11%)</td>
<td>E-7 to E-9: 8% of sample (Army ~ 19%)</td>
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<td>E-4 to E6: 9% of sample (Army ~ 18%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data presented a dominating case that current policies and
practices are potentially creating two groups; (1) individuals that repeatedly
deploy and (2) individuals that do not deploy at all. The Task Group
observed that end-strength had remained relatively flat since 2001. While
increasing end-strength in the Army and Marine Corps may relieve some
stress on the force, it would be equally important to maximize the use of
existing human capital to achieve the desired strategic effect.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Task Group presented their draft findings and recommendations
to the full Board on January 22, 2009 (see Appendix A). The DBB
approved the recommendation that the Secretary of Defense commission a
more in-depth study of the Military Services’ force utilization and deployment
policies and practices to:

- Review deployment data and make recommendations for a
  reasonable measure of “stress”,


Seek methods to lower the stress on the force and broaden the distribution of that stress across the total force, and

Examine the Military Services’ institutional enterprise assignment policies which appear to create excessive deployments of certain portions of the force while at the same time isolating others from deployment.

CONCLUSION

The DBB shares the Secretary and Chairman’s belief that our country’s greatest military assets are the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States. It is critical, therefore, that as the Department continues to examine force utilization that we look for any unintended consequences that may disrupt unit cohesion, readiness and families.

The DBB recognizes that force management is an extremely difficult task. The Board’s snapshot highlights an uneven utilization of the existing force. Despite the limitations in the data, the Board believes the conclusions present a dominating case. It is clear that almost three quarters of the force have either never been deployed or deployed for less than 12 months, while a smaller population of troops appear to be continuously deployed, creating excessive stress on those troops.

The DBB is hopeful that the Secretary will share the Board’s sense of urgency to conduct a more in-depth study of force utilization and move quickly to achieve a healthier and more effective force.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael Bayer                                      Fred Cook
Task Group Co-Chairman                            Task Group Co-Chairman
APPENDIX A

(TASK GROUP FINAL REPORT– OCTOBER 23, 2008)
TRANSITION TOPIC:
A Snapshot of the Utilization of Forces

TASK: Examine force utilization of the Military Services by analyzing Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) payroll data of active duty service members to determine how many months these individuals were in a combat zone since 2001

Purpose: To gain insights into the stress on the force and to recommend additional analysis

TASK GROUP:
Michael Bayer (Co-Chair)
Fred Cook (Co-Chair)
Dov Zakheim

Military Assistants
COL Kevin Doxey, USA
Col Dale Marks, USAF
ISSUE:

Since the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, the armed forces are fighting two major overseas conflicts, responding at home and maintaining a heightened state of readiness. This increased operational tempo has caused stress in certain parts of the force.

IMPORTANCE:

• Service leaders have indicated that these requirements are currently being met by longer than desirable deployments, over utilization of certain elements of the force, as well as, stop loss.

• The Army and the Marine Corps are in the process of increasing end strength to meet increased demand.

• Increased end strength alone may not relieve stress sufficiently if the current force is not fully utilized
## DBB Survey Sample Population of DFAS Payroll Data for Active Duty Service Members*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>MARINES</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1 – E3</td>
<td>353,294</td>
<td>117,125</td>
<td>81,880</td>
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<tr>
<td>E4 – E6</td>
<td>673,398</td>
<td>292,893</td>
<td>124,835</td>
<td>89,312</td>
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<tr>
<td>E7 – E9</td>
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<td>72,649</td>
<td>88,866</td>
<td>14,819</td>
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<tr>
<td>E1 – E9</td>
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<td>482,667</td>
<td>295,581</td>
<td>192,195</td>
<td>273,620</td>
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<tr>
<td>O1 – O2</td>
<td>52,311</td>
<td>18,443</td>
<td>12,745</td>
<td>6,655</td>
<td>14,468</td>
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<td>O3 – O4</td>
<td>122,620</td>
<td>46,141</td>
<td>28,817</td>
<td>10,026</td>
<td>37,636</td>
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<td>O5 – O6</td>
<td>46,776</td>
<td>16,664</td>
<td>11,605</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td>15,350</td>
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<tr>
<td>O7 – O10</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>306</td>
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<tr>
<td>O1 – O10</td>
<td>222,690</td>
<td>81,586</td>
<td>53,417</td>
<td>19,927</td>
<td>67,760</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>1,466,753</td>
<td>564,253</td>
<td>348,998</td>
<td>212,122</td>
<td>341,380</td>
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*Source: Defense Finance and Accounting Service Pay Records December 2008
(For purposes of comparison, does not include Warrant Officers)
Active Duty Military Services’ Authorized End-Strength Over Time
“Relatively Flat”

Source: As reported in the annual National Defense Authorization Act
Why Use Hostile Fire Pay?

• It’s commonly defined among all Armed Forces
• It’s a “truth teller” - Audited by DFAS
• A monthly payment provides a common unit of measure
Why Examine Specific Categories?

- Four categories used:
  - 25 months or greater = “Over Stressed”; individuals who have had multiple unit deployments and/or long-term augmentations
  - 17-24 months = “High Stressed”; individuals who have had two unit deployments and/or long-term augmentation
  - 13-16 months = “Low Stressed”; individuals who have a had at least one unit deployment or long-term augmentation
  - 12 months or less = “Not Stressed”; individuals who have not been on unit deployment or long-term augmentation

- Arbitrary, yet viewed as a reasonable length of time for exposure to conditions that warrant Hostile Fire Pay
Are there limitations?

• The data does not distinguish between special cases (e.g., wounded warriors, non-deployable, or Hostile Fire Pay for visits in and out of the combat zone)

• The data does not include those individuals who entered and left during the 88 month period and may actually underestimate the over-stressed/highly-stressed population

• The DFAS data within the four categories does not reflect the impact of Service specific policies on “dwell-time” to reduce stress on the force
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Country</th>
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<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DoD Financial Management Regulation Vol. 7-A, Chapter 10, Figure 10-1, dated December 2008
Percent of Active Duty **US Military** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present *(excludes Warrant Officers)*

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line*

- 12 months or less: 73% Officers, 74% Enlisted
- 13-16 months: 12% Officers, 12% Enlisted
- 17-24 months: 9% Officers, 7% Enlisted
- 25 months or greater: 6% Officers, 6% Enlisted

Total Personnel: 1,089,273 Officers + 179,638 Officers + 105,182 Enlisted + 92,660 Enlisted = 1,466,753
Percent of Active Duty US Military Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present *(excludes Warrant Officers)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 months or less*</td>
<td>163,034</td>
<td>926,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-16 months</td>
<td>27,095</td>
<td>152,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-24 months</td>
<td>19,727</td>
<td>85,455</td>
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<td>25 months or greater</td>
<td>12,834</td>
<td>79,826</td>
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Total Personnel: 1,089,273 + 179,638 + 105,182 + 92,660 = 1,466,753

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Percent of Active Duty US Military Officers Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line
Percent of Active Duty US Military Officers Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

- 12 months or less: 48,167
- 13-16 months: 34,359
- 17-24 months: 79,935
- 25 months or greater: 573

Total Personnel: 163,034 + 27,095 + 19,727 + 12,834 = 222,690

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line
Percent of Active Duty US Military Enlisted Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

- 12 months or less: 97%
- 13-16 months: 64%
- 17-24 months: 70%
- 25 months or greater: 0%

Total Personnel: 926,239 + 152,543 + 85,455 + 79,826 = 1,244,063
Percent of Active Duty US Military Enlisted Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line

Percent of Sample

Total Personnel: 926,239 + 152,543 + 85,455 + 79,826 = 1,244,063
Percent of Active Duty US Army Officers Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present (excludes Warrant Officers)

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line.
Percent of Active Duty **US Army Enlisted** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

- **12 months or less***: 110,815
- **13-16 months**: 35,299
- **17-24 months**: 126,068
- **25 months or greater**: 49,045

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line.

*Percent of Sample: 272,182, 95,059, 48,432, 66,994*
Observations for All Services

- **“Over Stressed” = 25 months or greater**

<table>
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- **“Highly Stressed” = 17-24 months**

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-5 to O-6: 13% of sample (Army ~ 13%)</td>
<td>E-7 to E-9: 13% of sample (Army ~ 15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3 to O-4: 21% of sample (Army ~ 17%)</td>
<td>E-4 to E6: 21% of sample (Army ~ 13%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25 months or greater of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Officers, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present (excludes Warrant Officers)

Total Personnel: 297 + 9,583 + 2,807 + 147 = 12,834
25 months or greater of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Officers, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present (excludes Warrant Officers)

- **Army**: 231, 47, 6, 13, 104, 12, 18
- **Navy**: 47, 6, 13, 6, 16, 13, 11
- **Marines**: 13, 6, 13, 18, 18, 18, 18
- **Air Force**: 13, 6, 13, 6, 13, 11, 18

Total Personnel: 297 + 9,583 + 2,807 + 147 = 12,834
25 months or greater of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Enlisted, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present

Total Personnel: 655 + 60,856 + 18,315 = 79,826
25 months or greater of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Enlisted, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present

Total Personnel: 655 + 60,856 + 18,315 = 79,826
17 – 24 months of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Officers, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present (excludes Warrant Officers)

Total Personnel: 812 + 14,470 + 4,299 + 146 = 19,727
17 – 24 months of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Officers, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present (excludes Warrant Officers)

Total Personnel: 812 + 14,470 + 4,299 + 146 = 19,727

- Army
- Navy
- Marines
- Air Force
17 – 24 months of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Enlisted, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present

Percent of Sample

Total Personnel: 1,599 + 62,858 + 20,998 = 85,455
17 – 24 months of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Enlisted, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present

**Total Personnel:**

- E1 - E3: 1,599
- E4 - E6: 62,858
- E7 - E9: 20,998

**Total:** 85,455
The data shows a significant number 74% (1,089K) of active duty personnel with \( \leq 12 \) months of combat duty while others 6% (93K) have \( \geq 25 \) months.

Among the Services, the Army appears to experience the greatest stress as a percentage of the population sample.

The data indicates that current policies and practices are potentially creating two groups---those that repeatedly deploy and those that don’t deploy at all.

Holding the group with \( \geq 25 \) months as it is, while managing the group with 13-16 months, could control the growth of the group with 17-24 months, and could further reduce the stress on those subjected to excessive deployments.

Of the sample populations, the data does not identify those individuals subjected to excessive deployments and/or higher rates of deployment, e.g. high demand/low density specialties, or those who may have left the Military Services because of stress.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Secretary of Defense should commission a study of the Military Services’ force utilization/deployment policies and practices to:

- Review deployment data and make recommendations for a reasonable measure of “stress”
- Seek methods to lower the stress on the force and broaden the distribution of that stress across the Total Force
- Examine the Military Services’ institutional enterprise assignment policies which appear to create excessive deployments of certain portions of the force while at the same time isolating others from deployment
Back Up
Methodology

- DFAS examined pay records of all active duty military servicemembers as of December 2008 to determine who received payment of Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) over the 88 month period from September 2001 to December 2008. The data was provided by rank/grade.

Definitions

- **Hostile Fire Pay**: Special pay for duty subject to hostile fire or imminent danger for any month a servicemember is subjected to hostile fire or explosion of a hostile mine, or on duty in an area in close proximity…, killed injured or wounded by hostile fire, explosion of hostile mine, or any other hostile action.

- **Combat Zone**: Area designated to receive hostile fire or imminent danger pay as defined in DoD Financial Management Regulation Vol. 7-A, Chapter 10, Figure 10-1, dated December 2008

- **Stop Loss**: Refers to the involuntary extension of a service member's active duty service under the enlistment contract in order to retain them beyond their end of the term of service (etc). In other words, the military exercises its desultory clause in their contract.
Designated Combat Zones

**Afghanistan.** This includes the airspace above Afghanistan.

**The Kosovo area.** The following locations (including air space above) have been designated as a combat zone and a qualified hazardous duty area:

- Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro)
- Albania
- The Adriatic Sea
- The Ionian Sea - north of the 39th parallel (including all of the airspace in connection with the Kosovo operation.)

**Persian Gulf area.** The following locations (including air space above) have been designated as a combat zone:

- The Persian Gulf
- The Red Sea
- The Gulf of Oman
- The part of the Arabian Sea that is north of 10 degrees north latitude and west of 68 degrees east longitude
- The Gulf of Aden
- The total land areas of *Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar,* and the United Arab Emirates

**Qualified hazardous duty area.** A qualified hazardous duty area in the former Yugoslavia is treated as if it is a combat zone. The qualified hazardous duty area includes:

- Bosnia and Herzegovnia
- Croatia
- Macedonia

*Source: DoD Financial Management Regulation Vol. 7-A, Chapter 10, dated December 2008*
### DoD Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL COHORT</th>
<th>Total Paid</th>
<th>% Total Paid</th>
<th>No HFP</th>
<th>% No HFP</th>
<th>1-12 months</th>
<th>% No HFP 1-12 months or less</th>
<th>13-16 months</th>
<th>% No HFP 13-16 months</th>
<th>17-24 months</th>
<th>% No HFP 17-24 months</th>
<th>25 months or greater</th>
<th>% No HFP 25 months or greater</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1 to E-3</td>
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<td>23.77%</td>
<td>269,320</td>
<td>76.23%</td>
<td>72,979</td>
<td>20.66%</td>
<td>342,299</td>
<td>96.89%</td>
<td>8,741</td>
<td>2.47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-4 to E-6</td>
<td>673,398</td>
<td>496,724</td>
<td>73.62%</td>
<td>177,674</td>
<td>26.38%</td>
<td>254,738</td>
<td>37.83%</td>
<td>432,142</td>
<td>64.21%</td>
<td>117,272</td>
<td>17.41%</td>
<td>62,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7 to E-9</td>
<td>217,371</td>
<td>159,755</td>
<td>73.49%</td>
<td>57,616</td>
<td>26.51%</td>
<td>93,912</td>
<td>43.20%</td>
<td>151,528</td>
<td>69.71%</td>
<td>26,530</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
<td>20,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>1,244,063</td>
<td>739,453</td>
<td>59.44%</td>
<td>504,610</td>
<td>40.56%</td>
<td>421,629</td>
<td>33.89%</td>
<td>926,299</td>
<td>74.45%</td>
<td>152,543</td>
<td>12.26%</td>
<td>85,455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total Cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL COHORT</th>
<th>Total Paid</th>
<th>% Total Paid</th>
<th>No HFP</th>
<th>% No HFP</th>
<th>1-12 months</th>
<th>% No HFP 1-12 months or less</th>
<th>13-16 months</th>
<th>% No HFP 13-16 months</th>
<th>17-24 months</th>
<th>% No HFP 17-24 months</th>
<th>25 months or greater</th>
<th>% No HFP 25 months or greater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-1 to O-2</td>
<td>52,311</td>
<td>19,383</td>
<td>36.14%</td>
<td>33,928</td>
<td>64.86%</td>
<td>14,239</td>
<td>27.22%</td>
<td>48,167</td>
<td>92.08%</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3 to O-4</td>
<td>122,620</td>
<td>93,630</td>
<td>76.36%</td>
<td>31,990</td>
<td>26.09%</td>
<td>47,946</td>
<td>39.10%</td>
<td>79,935</td>
<td>65.19%</td>
<td>18,632</td>
<td>15.19%</td>
<td>14,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5 to O-6</td>
<td>46,776</td>
<td>32,610</td>
<td>69.72%</td>
<td>14,166</td>
<td>30.28%</td>
<td>20,193</td>
<td>43.17%</td>
<td>34,359</td>
<td>73.45%</td>
<td>5,311</td>
<td>13.35%</td>
<td>4,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-7 to O-10</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>80.00%</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>46.20%</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>58.20%</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>222,690</td>
<td>145,488</td>
<td>65.33%</td>
<td>80,202</td>
<td>36.02%</td>
<td>82,832</td>
<td>37.20%</td>
<td>163,034</td>
<td>73.21%</td>
<td>27,095</td>
<td>12.17%</td>
<td>19,727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Cohort: 1,466,753
Data Observations of Active Duty US Military

- Officer
  - 59% of all officers have received Hostile Fire Pay (HFP)
  - 88% of all General/Flag Officers have received HFP
  - 15% of all General/Flag Officers have 25 months or greater of HFP
  - 6% of O5-O6 have 25 months or greater of HFP
  - 8% of O3-O4 have 25 months or greater of HFP
  - 13% of O5-O6 have 17 months or greater of HFP
  - 21% of O3-O4 have 17 months or greater of HFP
  - 73% of O5-O6 have 12 months or less of HFP
  - 65% of O3-O4 have 12 months or less of HFP
Data Observations of Active Duty US Military

- Enlisted
  - 59% of all enlisted have received Hostile Fire Pay (HFP)
  - 74% of NCOs (E4 and above) have received HFP
  - 8% of E7-E9 have 25 months or greater of HFP
  - 9% of E4-E6 have 25 months or greater of HFP
  - 13% of E7-E9 have 17 months or greater of HFP
  - 21% of E4-E6 have 17 months or greater of HFP
  - 70% of E7-E9 have 12 months or less of HFP
  - 64% of E4-E6 have 12 months or less of HFP
Percent of Active Duty US Army Soldiers Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line

Officer | Enlisted
---|---
12 months or less* | 46,343 | 272,182
13-16 months | 15,806 | 95,059
17-24 months | 4,843 | 48,432
25 months or greater | 9,010 | 65,994

Total Personnel: 318,525 + 110,865 + 58,859 + 76,004 = 564,253
Percent of Active Duty **US Navy** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

- **12 months or less***: 265,445
- **13-16 months**: 46,352
- **17-24 months**: 3,739
- **25 months or greater**: 3,289

Total Personnel: 348,998

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*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line.
Percent of Active Duty US Marines Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

- **12 months or less**: 153,423
  - Officers: 13,689
  - Enlisted: 142,734
- **13-16 months**: 22,398
  - Officers: 2,457
  - Enlisted: 19,941
- **17-24 months**: 12,576
  - Officers: 697
  - Enlisted: 11,879
- **25 months or greater**: 3,495
  - Officers: 278
  - Enlisted: 3,217

**Total Personnel:** 212,122

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated by dashed line.*
Percent of Active Duty **US Air Force** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 months or less*</td>
<td>225,189</td>
<td>56,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-16 months</td>
<td>17,054</td>
<td>4,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-24 months</td>
<td>4,421</td>
<td>1,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 months or greater</td>
<td>2,223</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Personnel: 291,839 + 21,520 + 19,053 + 8,968 = 341,380

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line.
12 months or less of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Officers, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present (excludes Warrant Officers)

Percent of Sample

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line

Total Personnel: 48,167 + 79,935 + 34,359 + 573 = 163,034
**12 months or less** of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Enlisted, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>E1-E3</td>
<td>110,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E4-E6</td>
<td>110,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E7-E9</td>
<td>73,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>E1-E3</td>
<td>84,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E4-E6</td>
<td>126,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E7-E9</td>
<td>35,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>E1-E3</td>
<td>151,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E4-E6</td>
<td>135,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E7-E9</td>
<td>91,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>E1-E3</td>
<td>926,239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Personnel: 342,299 + 432,412 + 151,528 = 926,239

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line*
# Average Military Promotion “Pin-On” Times*

## Enlisted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>E-2</th>
<th>E-3</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-7</th>
<th>E-8</th>
<th>E-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>6 mos</td>
<td>12 mos</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>4.2 years</td>
<td>8.5 years</td>
<td>13.6 years</td>
<td>17 years</td>
<td>20.8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>9 mos</td>
<td>18 mos</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>5.2 years</td>
<td>11.3 years</td>
<td>14.4 years</td>
<td>17.1 years</td>
<td>20.3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>6 mos</td>
<td>18 mos</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>4.8 years</td>
<td>10.4 years</td>
<td>14.8 years</td>
<td>18.8 years</td>
<td>22.1 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>6 mos</td>
<td>16 mos</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>4.4 years</td>
<td>12.9 years</td>
<td>16.9 years</td>
<td>19.7 years</td>
<td>22.1 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7 mos</td>
<td>16 mos</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>11 years</td>
<td>15 years</td>
<td>18 years</td>
<td>21 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Officer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O-2</th>
<th>O-3</th>
<th>O-4</th>
<th>O-5</th>
<th>O-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>18 mos</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>16 years</td>
<td>22 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of Active Duty Army and Marine Captains Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line

Percent of Sample

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

12 months or less* 13-16 months 17-24 months 25 months or greater

Army O-3 14,752 8,395 5,635 4,615
Marines O-3 7,083 1,312 4,588 4,348 267

Total Personnel: 33,397

42% 55% 25% 17% 16% 22% 18% 5%
Percent of Active Duty **Army** and **Marine Majors**
Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

*Includes those with zero months HFP, as indicated below dashed line*